The recombinant DNA controversy: A memoir. science, politics and the public interest 1974-1981 by Wright, Susan
depictions of medical practitioners, Porter
suggests, grew increasingly flattering, just 
as newer platforms for graphic humour —
such as Punch (founded in 1841) and Vanity
Fair (1868) — tended to eschew the coarse-
ness and vulgarity of Georgian and Regency
caricature. 
Broader cultural shifts plainly fostered
these new aesthetic conventions, but the role
of changes in medicine itself is less clear. And
in Porter’s treatment of the nineteenth 
century, as throughout the book, one would
have welcomed something about private
representation as a counterpoint to public
images and media constructs. If public rep-
resentations of Victorian healers and healing
shed much of their earthiness and theatrical-
ity, then what are we to make of certain more
covert genres of medical self-portraiture,
such as grizzly photographs depicting 
medical students at work in the dissecting
room, or of late-Victorian advice books that
unabashedly instructed doctors on how to
succeed in business by putting on a good
show? If the reader is left wanting more, 
however, it is because Porter’s book is 
one of the best studies we have of public 
representations of medicine, a highly 
visual culture in which spectacle and ritual
performance, although transformed, have
hardly vanished. ■
John Harley Warner is in the Section of the History
of Medicine, Yale University School of Medicine,
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Some 25 years ago, unease within the 
molecular-biology community over the
implications of the emerging techniques of
genetic engineering triggered a major public
controversy over possible hazards and misuse
of the new field. In the United States, the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), the
world’s leading biomedical research institu-
tion, was designated as the government
agency responsible for developing voluntary
controls. The controversy quickly encom-
passed the nature of the controls themselves,
which had been developed largely by scientists
whose career (and in some cases business)
interests were closely linked to the new field.
The still-dominant view of these events is
that the American public, along with a few
dissident scientists, overreacted to early 
concerns about the hazards of genetic engi-
neering. Eventually, the hazards were shown
to be exaggerated, allowing the NIH controls
to be dismantled. This conventional wisdom
casts the story as a confrontation in which
rational belief in science ultimately prevailed
over irrational fear of the unknown.
Donald Fredrickson, the NIH director
who presided over the rise and fall of the NIH
controls, elaborates on this story with his 
legendary panache. He covers the struggles of
the NIH not only with the attentive public but
also behind the scenes, with the executive and
legislative branches of the US government.
This previously invisible face of the recombi-
nant DNA controversy is now, apparently,
revealed in Fredrickson’s papers and personal
letters and diaries being deposited in the 
US National Library of Medicine. This collec-
tion promises to substantially augment the 
public record provided by the NIH and 
the important Recombinant DNA History 
Collection at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology archives.
The memoir leaves little doubt about
Fredrickson’s own view of the genetic-
engineering question as he describes the
adroit manoeuvres of the NIH to protect
“the gossamer quality of [its] pseudo-regula-
tions” from conversion by the US Congress
into mandatory controls that encompassed
the private sector and all government agen-
cies. Battle metaphors permeate this account
of the struggle between those deemed to be
‘for’ or ‘against’ the voluntary policy
espoused by the NIH. As he wrote in an
unpublished article on the eve of the first
major weakening of the NIH controls: “I
think we have won a significant victory over a
dangerously excessive reaction first set in
motion by scientists.” The fact that policy-
making in certain other countries — notably
the United Kingdom — took the turn
towards uniform regulation without a bitter
struggle is not noted here. This is very much
an American story, told by the person at the
epicentre of the American controversy.
But this narrative, with its strong focus
on genetic engineering as a research tool, is
strained. That the technique would move
out of the research laboratory and into 
medicine, industry, agriculture and, most
problematically, the military, was antici-
pated almost as soon as news of the first suc-
cessful experiments began to circulate. As
British molecular biologist Sydney Brenner
wrote in 1974 to the British committee con-
vened to examine genetic engineering, there
were likely to be problems of controlling
“institutions which can, and probably do,
practise secrecy in their activities, such as
defence research laboratories and, more
importantly, the major drug companies”. 
This wider potential was marked by 
Stanford University’s application for a patent
on the early genetic-engineering techniques
— an action that sent a shock wave through
the NIH as the government sponsor of this
work. “‘The patent’ was widely perceived as a
modestly seismic event, a nervous shift at the
conjunction of the academic/not-for-profit
and commercial tectonic plates sustaining
the crust of the biomedical research enter-
prise,” writes Fredrickson. From its in-
ception, genetic engineering promised to
yield socially disruptive technologies along
with advances in scientific knowledge and
socially useful products.
Fredrickson is aware of these larger
dimensions of genetic engineering, yet they
are never allowed to intrude on his narrative.
During his tenure, he was in contact with
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leaders of the pharmaceutical industry who
made it clear that they would adhere to “the
intent and spirit” of the NIH controls but not
necessarily to their specific requirements —
a position underscored by the flouting of the
NIH controls by the rising star of the
biotechnology field, Genentech, in 1978–79,
when it ignored NIH procedures for
approval of large-scale cultures of genetically
modified organisms. That industry rebel-
lion, underscoring the need for regulation of
the new industry and posing a real dilemma
for the NIH, which wanted at all costs to
avoid legislation, remains invisible in this
account. 
Similarly, the prospect of military use of
genetic engineering is mentioned but quick-
ly dismissed on the grounds that the problem
is addressed by the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention. That treaty has troubling loop-
holes, through which the genetic alteration
of highly pathogenic agents of biological
warfare has since slipped in the name of
defence. These loopholes were not addressed
when they were raised by members of
Fredrickson’s advisory committee in 1982;
nor are these problematic developments
confronted in this account.
Even viewing the genetic-engineering
problem through the lens of research,
Fredrickson skirts a question on which his
narrative depends: did the risk-assessment
experiments of the 1970s clear the field of
significant hazard? An important answer is
contained in a transcript of the first scientific
meeting convened at the NIH in 1976 to 
discuss risk assessment. The transcript
shows a key risk-assessment experiment
being designed by the participants not to test
a worst-case scenario, but rather to reassure
the public that genetic engineering was
harmless. As a participant noted, without
any sign of moral indignation from his 
colleagues, “[This is] molecular politics, not
molecular biology”. As an astute Nature
reporter later observed of the treatment of
the hazard question: “One must accentuate
the positive. The evidence, however, does not
seem substantial.”
Fredrickson acknowledges that the 
policies he pursued as NIH director, while
yielding important scientific advances and
medical benefits, also opened a Pandora’s
box of social and ethical problems. The new
evidence on the recombinant DNA contro-
versy promised by the release of his papers,
and by the release of other sources as they
become available, may reveal perspectives on
the controversy more troubling than the
soothing one presented in this memoir. ■
Susan Wright is a historian of science at
Residential College, University of Michigan, East
Quadrangle, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1245,
USA, and author of Molecular Politics:
Developing American and British Regulatory
Policy for Genetic Engineering, 1972–1982
(University of Chicago Press, 1994).
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The Cooperative Gene is a masterpiece of
scientific exposition. Mark Ridley has deftly
packaged a hugely complex subject — the
interplay of deleterious mutation with the
evolution of genetic systems — into one
long argument. He has distilled an area of
biology that is rife with abstruse mathemat-
ics and the arcana of molecular genetics
into a series of carefully explicated thought
experiments and metaphors. 
Despite the reassuring presence of a 
glossary, Ridley even manages to avoid jar-
gon, and in principle the book is accessible to
the general reader. However, it is not aimed
at the Stephen Jay Gould-reading (or indeed
Matt Ridley-reading) public. It lacks the
anecdotal colour that is de rigueur these days
if a book is to sail up the bestseller lists; there
are neither pen portraits of crusty old pro-
fessors peering down their microscopes nor
strange tales of Y-linked ear hairiness in 
Indian men. Ridley’s long argument is too
dense and unrelenting to appeal to readers
without a real interest in the subject; The
Cooperative Gene is, in fact, a monograph
masquerading as popular science.
Ridley’s thesis is that the history of life has
been shaped by evolution’s attempts to over-
come the effects of mutation. The occasional
mutation is beneficial — indeed, they are the
basis of adaptive evolution — but the vast
bulk of all mutation is, without doubt, 
deleterious: “A random mistake in the DNA
is  about as likely to improve the creature it
codes for as a random change in Hamlet is to
improve the play.” Ridley’s premise is that
deleterious mutation must be kept within
bounds if evolution is to occur: if the average
rate of deleterious mutation exceeds one 
per genome per generation, then all the
descendants of a parental generation with a
mutation-free genome may be carrying 
deleterious mutations. Natural selection is
then stymied because none of the competing
genomes in the population is free from the
taint of deleterious mutation and so it is 
not possible to select in favour of an intact,
non-mutated genome.
Ridley sees a tension between the evolu-
tion of complexity — which necessarily
involves encoding more information and
therefore requires more genes — and the
depredations of mutation. Assuming a con-
stant mutation rate per nucleotide, the large
genome of a complex being is more likely to
exceed the critical threshold of one deleteri-
ous mutation per genome per generation.
Ridley concludes that: “Live complexity hits
its ceiling when the DNA message is so long
that a mistake happens every time it is
copied. When life is near this upper limit,
complexity cannot evolve upwards even if
there is an ecological opportunity there.”
The history of life has been punctuated by
the evolution of “enabling mechanisms” that
improve the fidelity with which hereditary
information is replicated. The advent of
DNA, which is less prone to degradation
than RNA, as the vehicle for that information
represents one such mechanism; the evolu-
tion of error-checking and DNA-repair sys-
tems is another; and sex yet another. With
each innovation, the complexity ceiling rose.
Also militating against the evolution of
complexity are genetic elements that subvert
biological processes for their own ‘selfish’
ends, thus thwarting the cooperation
between genes that is required for com-
plexity. The simplest case of ‘mendelian 
law-breaking’ is meiotic drive, in which the
probability of an allele being transmitted to
the next generation is greater than the
canonical mendelian expectation of 50%.
For Ridley, the central player in the collision
between the forces that promote complexity
and those trying to tear it apart is meiosis. He
emphasizes that the genetic randomization
— through independent assortment and
recombination — inherent in the mendelian
process is critical in limiting the power 
and spread of genetic subversion. 
Ridley’s summary of the logic underlying
this claim is masterful: “Mendelian justice is
similar to the theory of human justice given
by John Rawls in his book A Theory of Justice.
Rawls argues that human beings will choose
justice if they are operating behind a ‘veil of
ignorance’. Imagine you are going to devise
or apply laws, or allocate resources, among a
number of people. Maybe you have to divide
a pie among five people including yourself. If
you know which piece is to be received by
which individual you may allocate most or
all of the pie to yourself; but if you do not
(you are veiled in ignorance) you may divide
the pie into equal pieces. The gene shuffling
mechanisms we have been thinking about
enforce Mendelian justice by drawing a veil
of ignorance over the genes.”
Ridley refers to meiosis, the primary agent
of mendelian justice, as “Mendel’s Demon”,
but the implicit parallel to science’s other dis-
tinguished demon is more misleading than
illuminating. In physicist James Maxwell’s
famous thought experiment, ‘Maxwell’s
Demon’ does the impossible: it oversees an
imaginary process that breaks the laws of ther-
modynamics. In contrast, the process over-
seen by Mendel’s is real: meiosis is no thought
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